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Penetration testing entails attacking a system to identify and report insecurity, but doing so without harming
the system nor encroaching on the dignity of those affected by it. To improve the interaction between
penetration testers and their processes and technology, we need to understand the factors that affect
decisions they make with ethical import. This paper presents four ethical hazards faced by penetration
testers, and three safeguards that address them. We also present preliminary results validating the hazards
and safeguards.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Penetration testers attack systems to gain assurance
about their security. These attacks take the form of
authorised “penetration tests” that probe a system’s
defences; these defences are breached to evaluate
the impact of any weaknesses; the results of these
tests are used to improve a system’s security,
making them resilient to further attacks. Penetration
testing requires technical prowess, creativity, and
ingenuity to find unexpected ways of breaching a
system. However, penetration testers face the added
constraint that finding and exploiting vulnerabilities
should neither harm the system nor encroach on the
dignity of those affected by it.
When faced with ethical dilemmas during the
planning, execution or reporting of a test, penetration
testers are expected to adopt different ethical
perspectives when deciding the right course of action
(Mouton et al. 2015). Recent work by the authors
(Faily et al. 2015) has shown that penetration testers
are subject to certain decision making biases; when
faced with ethical dilemmas, these biases influence
decisions of ethical import. To improve the interaction
between testers and their tools and techniques, we
need to typify the situations where such decisions
might be made, and identify factors that positively or
negatively impact these situations.
In this paper, we present four ethical hazards
associated with penetration testing, and three
safeguards that minimise their impact. We describe
Figure 1: Penetration tester persona (Ben) derived from
the model of ethical hazards and safeguards
the approach taken in Section 2, summarise the
ethical hazards and safeguards in Section 3, and
present preliminary results validating the hazards
and safeguards in Section 4.
2. APPROACH
We analysed transcripts from eight semi-structured
interviews with professional penetration testers;
each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes.
These transcripts were collected during previous
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work by the authors (Faily et al. 2015). Using
Grounded Theory (Corbin and Strauss 2008), we
analysed the transcripts and develop a qualitative
model of ethical hazards and safeguards.
To validate this emerging model, we used the
Persona Case process (Faily and Fléchais 2011)
and the CAIRIS software tool (Faily 2016) to derive
two personas from this grounded theory model.
These personas were based on an experienced
penetration tester (Ben) and a penetration test
manager (Matt). The personas were distributed to
the interviewees for comments and, based on the
feedback, subsequent axial and selective coding
identified several key concepts. The personas have
also been made publicly available (Faily and Iacob
2015), e.g. Figure.1.
3. ETHICAL HAZARDS AND SAFEGUARDS
We elicited the following four ethical hazards: these
are situations likely to increase the probability
of unethical behaviour because of the means,
motive, and opportunity to engage in such behaviour
(Pendse 2011).
• Legal Ambiguity: The uncertainty associated
with addressing unusual forms of illegality
when encountered, or dilemmas between
following the agreed rules of engagement, or
informing law enforcement agencies
• Human Targets: Any testing activities with the
potential to jeopardise the career or well-being
of test subjects.
• Red Team vs Blue Team: Tensions that arise
between testers (red teams) and client IT
teams responsible for interacting with them
(blue teams).
• Client Indifference: Occurrences where clients
are reluctant to make changes prescribed
by penetration testers, or downplay the
significance of problems found.
These hazards are mitigated by the following three
safeguards:
• Risk Articulation: the explanation of security
risks, and the impact these have when put in
a meaningful context.
• Service Comprehension: the understanding
that clients have about the penetration test
service they have commissioned.
• Responsibility to Practice: the sense of re-
sponsibility that testers have to the penetration
testing profession.
4. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
To confirm the presence of the ethical hazards and
safeguards, we surveyed professional penetration
testers to compare whether their understanding of
ethical hazards and safeguards corresponded with
those in the model we created. Because of the
sensitivity of this topic, we used the personas as a
vehicle for getting testers to describe their personal
opinions about these ethical issues. We applied the
approach described in (Faily and Fléchais 2014)
to generate a goal model of one of the personas:
Ben. This model was represented in the Goal-
oriented Requirements Language (Liu and Yu 2004).
All four ethical hazards were evident from this
model. The goal model was imported into jUCMNav
(Mussbacher et al. 2009), where the model was
evaluated to examine the effects that denying the
goals associated with the ethical hazards might have
on other goals that Ben wishes to satisfy.
We created a premortem scenario (Klein 2007) to
illustrate the impact of these goals being denied. This
was circulated to penetration testers in a security
consultancy with approximately the same level
of professional experience as Ben. The scenario
described how Ben, while supervising a junior tester,
carried out a test with catastrophic results to the
client. Participants were asked to provide open-
ended responses with reasons why Ben might have
behaved unethically (ethical hazards), together with
things that the company could do to address the
problems found (safeguards).
Five participants responded via email with 18
candidate ethical hazards, and 21 candidate
safeguards. Each candidate ethical hazard was
coded based on related goals, and goals directly
harmed as a result. Each candidate safeguard was
categorised based on related goals, and goals
directly safeguarded.
14 of the 18 candidate ethical hazards corresponded
with at least one ethical hazard from the model.
Three of the candidate ethical hazards not in the
model related to unwarranted trust placed in the tools
used by the junior tester; the other was attributed
to Ben not properly supervising the junior tester. All
candidate safeguards corresponded to at least one
safeguard from the model.
In future work, we will replicate this validation
for Matt, and a premortem scenario specific to a
penetration test manager. We will also explore the
value tensions associated with penetration testing
tools, and the factors that influence the trust
professional testers place in them.
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